I. Introduction
The pre-transition industrial structure in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was primarily driven by a raw material base, influenced by central planning decisions and rarely based on comparative advantage considerations. In the Soviet Union in particular, enterprises were highly integrated into an industrial network and thus were largely dependent on supplies of raw materials from other parts of the region. Following the collapse of the socialist system and the resolution of CMEA, the trade and supply links broke up virtually overnight and what might have been an economically viable production network -a very strong assumption to make concerning soviet-era industrial giants -turned out to be making huge losses on public accounts. Industrial enterprises which were almost never involved in marketing and distribution of their products suddenly found themselves in an environment where they had to make their own production decisions and adjust to new economic conditions. These developments coupled with deteriorating macroeconomic conditions drastically changed the enabling environment for industrial sector enterprises.
From the initial years of transition, countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union have faced the challenge of industrial restructuring and growth. Various subsector programs defining 'strategic directions' of development were designed and put in place. Yet quite often policy responses were limited to protectionist measures aimed at preserving output and/or employment of (mostly still state owned) industrial enterprises.
Bearing in mind the political importance of large industrial firms, in most cases governments were reluctant to liquidate them, hence effectively allowing them to continue running losses. Moreover, in cases where enterprises were considered important, direct state subsidies and credits were made available. This resulted in situations where state owned enterprises were subjected to very little or no financial discipline -an unlikely goal of any industrial policy in the region.
Here we do not intend to discuss specific details of any industrial policy in transition economies. Neither do we focus on the role the conventional determinants of industrial policy (e.g. Trade and Exchange Rate Regimes, Investment and Capital Accumulation, etc.) played in shaping the outcomes of those policies. Our intention here is to introduce yet another channel through which industrial policymakers In Transition Economies are likely to be able to affect industrial growth.
Following recent studies on economic growth, and in particular those exploring the link between institutional quality and economic growth in general (e.g. Knack and Keefer [1995] , Clague et al. [1995] ) we attempt to test the relationship between industrial growth and institutional quality indicators. Owing to the lack of sufficiently long time series and relatively poor quality of data, we did not base our analysis on transition economies. Instead we used a sample of 27 developing countries of Asia and Latin America containing data from 1982 to 1997 to derive our conclusions 2 . We present evidence of a strong effect of various indicators of institutional quality and financial development on industrial growth. We then hypothesize that the results obtained in the paper will hold for a wide range of transition/developing countries.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section II establishes the theoretical link between quality of institutions and growth. Section III goes on to describe the institutional quality indicators to be used in the study. We then outline the basic econometric model and discuss regression results in Section IV. Finally, Section V contains concluding remarks and predictions.
II. Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth
It is only relatively recently that economists have attempted to explain the fraction of growth otherwise unexplained by simple factor accumulation by emphasizing the importance of increasing returns to human capital (e.g. Lucas (1988) , Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1988 ), technological change (e.g. Solow (1956) ), ownership (e.g. Morck et al. (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) ), etc. On the other hand, Olson (1982) , North (1990) , Clague and Rausser (1991) among others reiterated the vitality of building up adequate legal infrastructure and proper functioning institutions in promoting economic growth.
Arguments in favor of strong institutional structure are numerous: (1) transaction costs associated with running business are likely to increase in the presence of corruption and bureaucratic obstacles; (2) barriers to entry and exit might become very high without a clear and transparent legal and regulatory mechanisms governing entry and exit; and (3)
gains from trade are easier to realize when transactions are carried out through efficiently functioning market mechanisms. On a similar note, Scully (1988) writes that "life, liberty and property are not additively separable attributes; the diminution of one diminishes all. Security of rights affects their value." Clague et al. (1995) in turn emphasize irreversibility of commitments as essential for multiple-party contracts.
Perhaps the grand summary argument brought forward in favor of a developed legal system and mechanisms of contract enforcement is that markets are less likely to exist when property rights and contract enforcement are absent or inadequate.
The quality of institutions and legal framework are also likely to affect growth through the ability of financial sector to channel resources to finance productive activities. In the absence of an adequate regulatory framework and supervision the ability of domestic banks to mobilize funds will be strongly undermined by a lack of depositors'
confidence. This will drift funds abroad and generally away from viable domestic investment opportunities. On the other hand, under inefficient property rights and an underdeveloped system of title registration, realizing liquidity from collateral can be quite
costly. This has a potential of undermining financial institutions' ability to lend to the extent they could, had they faced better property rights legislation and enforcement.
Exploring the link between quality of institutions and financial depth, La Porta et al. (1997) summarize: "To the extent that better legal protections enable the financiers to offer entrepreneurs money at better terms, …countries with better legal protection should have more external finance in the form of both higher valued and broader capital markets".
A growing body of empirical literature has tried to incorporate various indicators of institutional quality, civil liberties and the legal framework into conventional growth equations. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) , and Scully (1988) find a strong effect of the Gastil civil liberties index on rates of investment and economic growth. A World Bank study by Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) finds that the differences between institutional frameworks (as perceived by private sector agents) in Transition countries may account for differences in countries' relative economic performance. La Porta et al. (1997) find strong evidence that the legal environment (measured by an indicator of Rule of Law) and institutional quality have a significant effect on the size of capital markets for their sample of 49 countries.
It is rather simple to make a point about an even stronger link between institutional quality factors and industrial growth. Bearing in mind the nature of industrial technological process, few would disagree that the industrial sector on average requires longer term contractual agreements, larger capital investments and more numerous supplier (and maybe even customer) links. Hence there is a stronger need for a more adequate legal and regulatory framework to enforce multiple-party and/or longer term contracts. Although being a public good by nature, it might perhaps be useful to look at quality of institutions and law enforcement as an input to production. Then our earlier point can be rephrased with "the more a production process relies upon suppliers, sources of credit, and technological innovations, the more institutional-quality-intensive the production process becomes." Subsequently, scarcity of this one input makes it harder, sometimes even impossible, to invest and engage in productive activities the more institutional-quality-intensive the production process is. In what follows, the effect of developed institutions and contract enforcement on growth will be at least as pronounced in industry as it is in other sectors. Without testing the hypothesis of the relative importance of institutional quality on various sectors in the economy, the paper contributes to the empirical growth literature in that it establishes empirically the relationship between a broad range of institutional quality indicators and industrial growth.
III. Institutional Quality Variables
The dataset containing measures of institutional quality and contract enforcement to be and expropriations be high, rational private agents will discount the future streams of income from investment at a higher rate which ceteris paribus could lead to lower aggregate investment and slower economic growth.
The PRS indicators of Corruption and Bureaucratic Quality are intended to measure the corruption and strength of bureaucratic apparatus of the government respectively. Corruption and bureaucratic quality are viewed as impediments to investment and growth primarily because they have a potential of distorting the economic and financial environment by increasing the transaction costs faced by economic agents.
The most common forms of corruption and bureaucratic barriers met directly by firms are demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of investments.
The Rule of Law indicator measures the soundness of political institutions, strength of court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power. This indicator reflects the extent to which economic agents are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and arbitrate disputes. A high risk point total means that there is a strong law and order tradition, while a low risk point total means there is a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims. The country distribution of PRS indicators is presented in Table 1 .
IV. The Model
Assuming an endogenous growth model, Barro (1991) and define their cross-country growth regression equation as follows:
where ln(y 0 ) is (logarithm of) initial level of per capita output, and ln(educ) is (logarithm of) average education indicator. Including a measure of initial per capita output intends to capture the phenomenon of declining marginal product (assumed for a conventional neoclassical production function) which is instrumental in establishing the (conditional) convergence to a steady-state output per capita across countries. Replacing general economic output with industrial value added and introducing institutional quality indicators to Equation 1 yields:
where ln(IVA97) and ln(IVA82) are (natural logarithms of) per capita industrial value added in 1997 and 1982 respectively, PRS is Institutional Quality indicator, and ε is the error term. (Subscript i indicates country) .
OLS Result
Yet the above equations suffer from a major drawback: they are derived under a simplifying assumption that rates of factor accumulation are the same across countries (see for a discussion). Following Mankiw et al. (1992) 
where ln(I/GDP) is the (natural logarithm of the) ratio of aggregate gross fixed investment to GDP. Estimates based on the above equation are reported in Table 2 . Enrollment ratio failed to provide the sings (and significance) of coefficients predicted by theory 5 . Owing to the lack of reliable data on High Education we included the (logarithm of the) Tertiary Enrollment rate as an explanatory variable to capture the effect of human 4 The composite measure of PRS variables included in the 6 th regression is a simple average of PRS variables 1through 5. Note that including the PRS Composite measure in an equation is identical to including all 5 PRS variables into the regression and restricting their coefficients to be the same for all 5 variables. 5 In another attempt to improve the "performance" of educational indicators, we included Government Educational Expenses (reported by UNESCO) as an explanatory variable. Doing so improved the results but only marginally. The probable cause, we believe, is that (in poor countries in particular) educational expenses might be somewhat biased towards Secondary Education (and against Higher Education and subsequently R&D). Should this be the case the educational expenses would only give us very limited information about the true distribution of Education in the country and thus will not be able to capture the true effect of education on industrial growth.
capital. The results suggest that post-secondary Education (measured here by Tertiary
Enrollment) is at least as important as Secondary Education. Overall, four independent variables included in each regression were able to explain from 62 to 75 percent of variations in the explanatory variable.
Two Stage Approach
However, it might be argued that Equation 3 suffers from a simultaneity problem introduced by the possible endogeneity of investment with respect to (industrial) growth 6 .
We utilize the Two-Stage (2SLS) estimation procedure to account for the potential endogeneity of the investment rate. Table 3  9 . 6 Yet we argue that the extent of potential bias is lessened in our regressions because of the fact that we use economy-wide investment (as opposed to investment into industrial sector alone) in the equations. 7 It can be shown that even if the explanatory variable is not endogenous by itself, averaging both dependent and independent variables across time biases OLS estimates of coefficients and standard errors. This also imposes a limitation on the choice of instruments in cases where the variable to be instrumented is time averaged -instruments used in first-stage regression thus cannot be time averaged. 8 The first stage regression of the (logarithm of the) average investment-to-GDP ratio on initial values of all 5 PRS indicators provided a remarkable fit: R-squared equals 0.51, indicating that over 50 percent of variation in investment ratio (in the long run) is explained by the institutional quality variables alone. The above specification predicts a larger rate of conversion to a common cross-country steady state of per capita industrial output than that suggested by previous specifications.
Another set of findings is worth paying special attention to: the results above suggest that developed legal and regulatory framework positively influences industrial growth both through investment and total factor productivity. To put it differently, the fact that after controlling for an estimated rate of investment, coefficients on PRS indicators remain strong (see Table 3 ), suggests that institutional quality affects both the amount of investment in the economy as well as the efficiency of resource allocation (at least in the industrial sector).
It can be inferred from the regression results that ceteris paribus a one percent increase in per capita industrial value added can be achieved by either a 7.7 percent increase in the level of Tertiary Enrollment or a 2.2 percent increase in the rate of The results are consistent with those reported in Table 3 and if contrasted with the latter can hardly be viewed as indicative of multicollinearity. 10 Reported elasticities are based on the sixth specification, i.e. where the PRS Composite measure is used.
rate for their sample of 98 non-oil producing countries to be around 0.5. Finally, including all five institutional quality variables and restricting their coefficients to be the same improves the regression fit (see equation 6).
At this stage we foresee arguments against using contemporaneous values of institutional quality measures to explain the variations in the industrial growth. This is the same as saying that industrial growth in turn may be causing improvements in the underlying institutional quality measures. Although we formally account for possible endogeneity of these variables below, we dismiss these arguments (at least partially) based on the fact that (albeit correlated with general economic growth) industrial growth alone is unlikely to generate major changes in the legal system, contract enforcement and level of corruption. To check for possible endogeneity in the institutional quality variables, a robustness test of the results with respect to the (timing of the) institutional variables was conducted. We did so by including initial (1982) values of PRS indicators in the above specification, which does not change the qualitative importance of the results and changes the magnitudes and significance pattern of the coefficients only marginally 11 .
To check the robustness of our results with respect to different measures of Institutional Quality, we introduced yet another measure of institutional quality -the Contract-Intensive Money ratio. Introduced by Clague et al. (1995) as the ratio of noncash balances within M2 12 , the measure intends to quantify contract enforcement and property rights. We report these results in Table 4 . They appear to go along the lines of 11 The results of those regressions are available from the authors upon request. 12 The ratio is defined as ( Having documented this, we turn to the policy implications of our results.
Empirical and anecdotal evidence from developing countries suggest that governments seldom lack the capacity to design and implement full-fledged industrial policies using traditional determinants such as trade, tax and foreign exchange regimes without introducing major distortions, generating sizable costs and providing disincentives for entrepreneurs to engage in productive activities in some areas. Instead of going as far as rejecting the merits of those policies, we propose using a complementary set of measures that can be applied universally and with minimum distortions across various sectors in the economy and industrial sector in particular. Our research suggests that policy makers should devote resources and efforts to reducing corruption, eliminating bureaucratic barriers, improving contract enforcement and the legal environment. Separate attention should be given to measures which are capable of deepening the financial sector, improving financial sector infrastructure and increasing the efficiency of financial transactions.
It should also be noted that we are far from suggesting that ongoing policies be put on hold in favor of new ones directed at improving measures of Institutional Quality.
Instead, in the light of our results, we suggest that institution building in Transition
Countries be viewed as an essential complementary measure to accompany large scale privatization, flow of public and private investments in education and R&D, and measures promoting Foreign Direct Investment 13 .
Finally, we hypothesize (without testing it here) that the marginal effect of institutional improvements on industrial growth might, in fact, be stronger in Transition economies (compared to Asian and Latin American countries), where traditions of market oriented business institutions were virtually absent for decades -a proposition that can be tested by further research. 
